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What are the properties of optimal fiscal and monetary poli-
cies with heterogeneous agents? This is a pressing question, given
the wealth of evidence on heterogeneity in cash holdings and labor
income. Yet, until recently it remained largely unexplored. In this
paper, I show that with heterogeneity the Friedman rule is optimal
only if positive nominal interest rates do not ameliorate constraints
on redistribution. With an empirically plausible cross-sectional cor-
relation between money holdings and labor income, the Friedman
rule is optimal if the government favors redistribution to the poor.
I discuss these findings and propose several directions for future
research. [JEL Classification: E52, E61, E63, H21].
Quali sono le proprietà delle politiche monetarie e fiscali ot-
time quando l’eterogeneità introduce un conflitto tra redistribuzione
ed efficienza? Si tratta di una domanda pressante, dato il monte
di evidenza sulla disuguaglianza nei redditi e nella ricchezza nella
popolazione. Eppure, pochi studi se ne sono sinora occupati.
Questo saggio dimostra che la Friedman rule, che prevede l’azzera-
mento dei tassi di interesse nominali, è ottima solo quando un au-
mento dei tassi di interesse non influenza i vincoli sulle politiche
redistributive. Con ipotesi realistiche sulla correlazione tra reddito
individuale e domanda di moneta, la Friedman rule è ottima so-
lo se il governo desidera redistribuire in favore dei poveri.
1. - Introduction
The optimality of the Friedman rule is one of the main results
in the literature on optimal government policies with commitment.
Friedman (1969) argument is that any positive value of the
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* <stefania.albanesi@columbia.edu>.nominal interest rate effectively amounts to a distorting tax on
cash holdings. Thus, equalizing the return on money to that of
other assets minimizes distortions and improves efficiency. This
logic presumes that the government has access to other less
distortionary sources of revenues, but this need not be true in
general. Phelps (1973) argues that in a public finance model in
which the government sets distortionary taxes on commodities
and labor income, it may well be optimal to tax cash holdings if
the interest elasticity of money demand is lower than the price
elasticity of other commodities in absolute value.
Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1996) adopt Phelp’s public fi-
nance approach and only allow for distorting taxes. They show
that Friedman rule is optimal for a class of preferences that is
broadly used in macroeconomic models. Essentially, the require-
ment is that income elasticity of money demand is equal or greater
than one, and that preferences are weakly separable between con-
sumption and labor. Their argument is an application of the in-
verse elasticity rule of commodity taxation. If the income elastic-
ity on money demand is greater than one, it is optimal set the tax
on cash holdings lower than on other commodities. This is im-
possible given the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates,
which implies that the Friedman rule holds for a large class of
preferences.
The optimality of the Friedman rule is robust. For one, the
required restrictions on preferences are those that guarantee
consistency with balanced growth (Alvarez, Kehoe and Neumeyer,
2004), and when these restrictions are not satisfied, the optimal
nominal interest rate is very close to zero (Correia and Teles,
1999). The Friedman rule fails to hold when the tax system is
incomplete. For example, a departure from the Friedman rule
might be optimal as a way to tax monopoly profits when a
corporate income tax is not available for this purpose (Schmidt-
Grohe and Uribe, 2004a). Similarly, the Friedman rule, which
requires that inflation is equal to the negative of the real interest
rate, generates relative price distortions in economies with sticky
prices and thus may fail to hold (Schmidt-Grohe and Uribe,
2004b). However, if the relative price distortions can be removed
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is reinstated.
What happens when redistributional considerations are
introduced? This is a pressing question, given the wealth of
evidence on heterogeneity in transaction patterns, asset holdings
and labor income. Recent results suggest that the trade-off
between redistribution and efficiency generically undermines the
optimality of the Friedman rule. In this paper, I study the optimal
fiscal and monetary policy with heterogenous agents and show
that the Friedman rule is optimal only if positive nominal interest
rates do not ameliorate constraints on redistribution via labor
taxes. In particular, for economies that exhibit empirically plausible
cross-sectional correlations between money holdings and labor
income, the Friedman rule is optimal only if the government wishes
to redistribute in favor of the poor.
I begin by analyzing a simple one period example that clear-
ly illustrates how restrictions on redistribution stemming from the
structure of labor taxes or incentive compatibility constraints gen-
erate departures from the Friedman rule. I then study an econo-
my where heterogeneity in transaction patterns arises endoge-
nously from differences in labor productivity. Low skill agents hold
more cash as a fraction of total purchases, consistent with cross-
sectional evidence in the US (Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin, 2000,
Erosa and Ventura, 2002) and other countries (Guiso, Haliassos
and Jappelli, 2001). The government taxes labor income at a pro-
portional rate and sets the nominal interest rate. The model sim-
plifies to the one considered in Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1996)
once heterogeneity is removed. The Friedman rule turns out to be
optimal only if the Pareto weight on low skill agents is high
enough. This result is based on a simple logic. The linearity of
the labor income tax constrains the government’s ability to redis-
tribute and inflation thus assumes an auxiliary role. The labor in-
come tax weighs more heavily on high skill agents, whereas in-
flation is a greater burden for low skilled agents. Thus, if the gov-
ernment favors high skill agents, a departure from the Friedman
rule is optimal. If the government favors low skill agents, it is op-
timal to subsidize cash holdings. Since the zero lower bound con-
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rule is the best policy if the Pareto weight on low skill agents is
high enough.
da Costa and Werning (2007) also study an economy where
agents differ in labor productivities and the government sets labor
income taxes and the nominal interest rate. They allow labor
income taxes to be non-linear and assume that individual labor
productivities are private information, following Mirrlees (1971).
The government can use individual specific lump sum taxes to
achieve any amount of redistribution. However, private
information on individual abilities introduces incentive
compatibility constraints. In particular, low skill agents’ labor
supply must be distorted to prevent high skill agents from
mimicking those with low skills. The incentive compatibility
constraints limits redistribution and the nominal interest rate
could play an auxiliary role if it relaxes these constraints. da Costa
and Werning assume that money and labor effort are gross
complements and show that the Friedman rule is optimal. Under
this condition, the demand for money rises with labor effort, for
given consumption. Then, a reduction in the nominal interest rate
relaxes incentive compatibility constraints, since an increase in
the demand for money also increases labor effort. Again, given the
zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate, the best policy to
ameliorate the incentive problem to follow the Friedman rule.
While these results appear prima facie inconsistent, they can
be interpreted as an application of the uniform commodity
taxation principle. Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) show that, if the
labor income tax schedule is sufficiently unconstrained or the
income elasticity does not vary across goods, all commodities
should be taxed at the same rate, irrespective of agents’ weight in
the social welfare function. A proportional labor tax generates a
conflict between efficiency and redistribution that induces the
government to abandon uniform commodity taxation if
redistributional goals are present and income elasticities vary
across goods. Similarly, with non-linear labor income taxes and
private information on individual labor productivities, differential
commodity taxation may be optimal as a screening device. In a
RIVISTA DI POLITICA ECONOMICA LUGLIO-AGOSTO 2007
6monetary economy, uniform commodity taxation translates into
optimality of the Friedman rule. Moreover, the zero lower bound
constraint the nominal interest rate implies that the Friedman rule
will also hold in all those cases that would call for a lower tax
rate on cash purchases relative to other consumption goods in a
real economy.
These results confirm the connection between optimality of
the Friedman rule in monetary economies and optimality of uni-
form commodity taxation in real economies, established by
Charm, Christiano and Kehoe (1996) for representative agent mod-
els. They also establish a general principle for heterogeneous agent
economies. For models that display an empirically plausible cor-
relation between cash holdings and labor income, the Friedman
rule is optimal only if the government wishes to distribute in fa-
vor of the poor. I prove this result under proportional labor in-
come taxes in this paper. The analysis in da Costa and Werning
(2007) suggests that this principle also holds with non-linear la-
bor taxes. Under utilitarian social welfare, they prove that the
Friedman rule is optimal when cash holdings and labor income
are gross complements. This restriction on preferences implies a
positive correlation between cash holdings and labor income,
which is inconsistent with the empirical evidence. If cash hold-
ings and labor income are gross substitutes, a departure from the
Friedman rule would relax incentive compatibility constraints and
improve efficiency. However, the Friedman rule may still be opti-
mal if the government values distribution towards low productiv-
ity agents enough.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 analyzes a simple
one period economy and illustrates the conditions for the
optimality of the Friedman rule in relation to the constraints on
redistribution. Section 2 draws a connection between these findings
and the uniform commodity taxation principle, as well as the
optimality of the Friedman rule in representative agent economies.
It also discusses the empirical evidence on transaction patterns and
asset holdings and relates it to the theoretical findings. Section 3
studies optimal policies in a dynamic economy with endogenous
heterogeneity in transaction patterns. Section 4 discusses the time
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5 discusses the effect of aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks, and
Section 6 concludes by pointing to numerous open questions for
future work.
2. - Redistribution and the Friedman Rule: A Simple Example
To  illustrate the forces shaping the optimal setting of
monetary and fiscal policies in economies with heterogeneous
agents, I begin by describing a simple one period economy. A
subset of commodities, cash goods, are purchased with currency,
while the others, credit goods, are not subject to this requirement.
The distinction between cash and credit goods is built into
preferences, as in Lucas and Stokey (1983). The nominal interest
rate,  R, simply corresponds to the relative price of cash goods.
Agents supply labor and differ in labor productivities. Letting T
(l) denote the tax on labor income, l, government policy is given
by {R, T (l)}. In the first example, T (l) is linear in l. In the second
example, labor taxes are non-linear and individual productivities
are private information. In both examples, the optimal nominal
interest rate depends on the interaction between the demand for
cash goods and labor supply.
2.1 Linear Income Taxation
The economy is populated by a continuum of agents who
differ in labor productivity, ξ. Half of the agents have productivity,
ξ
1, and the other half, ξ
2, with ξ
2 > ξ
1 > 0. Their preferences are
given by:
(1) U (c1, c2, l/ξ
i) = u1, (c1) + u2 (c2) – l/ξ
i
where c1 and c2 denote cash and credit goods respectively. Here
ui (⋅) for i = 1, 2 are strictly increasing and strictly concave
functions, defined on the positive reals.






i}i=1,2 to maximize (1) taking as given
the nominal interest rate and the tax on labor income, {R, T (l)}.








Following the tradition of the Ramsey taxation literature, I
assume that the labor income tax is affine, so that T (l) = – τ – +
τl. Here, τ – > 0 corresponds to a lump sum transfer and τ is the
proportional rate on labor income. The solution to an agent’s




The resource constraint is:
(6)
where  g > 0 is exogenous government consumption. The
government budget constraint is:
(7)
Conditions (3)-(7) for i = 1, 2 characterize an equilibrium for
this economy and represent a mapping between government
policy, {R,  τ,  τ –} with R ≥ 1, and equilibrium allocations. The
constraint on R corresponds to the zero lower bound constraint
on nominal interest rates in monetary economies. The Ramsey
equilibrium is simply the best equilibrium from the standpoint of
the social welfare function. Let social welfare be given by:
(8)
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9where η
i ∈ [0, 1] with ∑i η
i = 1 correspond to the Pareto weights
for the two groups of agents. Formally, the government chooses
{R, τ, τ –} to maximize (8) subject to (3)-(6) for i = 1, 2.
The most effective way to characterize the Ramsey
equilibrium is to pose the government problem in the allocation
space. This requires expressing the set of equilibrium conditions
(3)-(6) in terms of allocations only. This reformulation of the
problem is known as the primal approach to Ramsey policies (see
Chari and Kehoe, 1999). This approach is particularly interesting
for this economy since it clarifies the constraints on redistribution
that are implicit in the policy instruments available to the
government.
The first constraint can be derived by expressing (5) in terms
of allocations only, using (3)-(4) to substitute for τ –, τ and R, and
combining the result with (7). This gives rise to the following
constraint:
(9)
This condition, known as implementability constraint, does
not capture all the constraints on Ramsey allocations. There are
two wedges in this economy, the cash-credit wedge, which
corresponds to (3), and the consumption-labor wedge, captured
by (4). Since all agents face the same nominal interest rate and
the proportional tax rate on labor income is not agent specific,
these wedges must be equalized across agents. In addition, in any
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10Constraints (10)-(11) clearly identify the limitat to redistribut-
ion in this economy. The linear labor income tax induces (11),
which implies that relative consumption levels in the population
are solely driven by relative productivities and cannot be influ-
enced by the government. Still, differences in labor productivities
may generate differences in consumption pattern. Since value of
R above 1 effectively correspond to a subsidy to credit good con-
sumption, they could in part offset the restriction imposed by (11). 
Constraints (10)-(11) will typically be binding and they shape
the properties of Ramsey policies. To examine the effect of the
constraints on redistribution imposed by the linearity of labor in-
come taxes and (10), it is useful to first solve a version of the
Ramsey allocation problem where constraints (10)-(11) are
dropped. Attaching multipliers µ ˜ ≥ 0 and λ ˜ ≥ 0 to (9) and (6), re-




for i, j = 1, 2, where µ = 0.5 µ ˜ and λ = 0.5λ ˜.
Equation (12) immediately implies:
for i = 1, 2. Let assume for simplicity: uj (c) = c
1-σ/ (1 – σ) for σ
> 0. Combining (12) for j = 2 and (13) obtains:
for  i = 1, 2. This condition clearly violates (11) unless  η
1 =  η
2.
Thus, generically, if the government has redistributional goals, that
is η
1 ≠η
2, (11) will be binding.
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11Let’s now impose (11) on the Ramsey allocation problem,
while still ignoring (10). Denote with χ the Lagrangian multiplier





for i = 1, 2, with complementary slackness condition:
Combining (14) and (13) obtains:
for i = 1, 2. By (11):
(15)
Combining (14) and (12) for i = 1, 2:
(16)
The inability of the government to redistribute via labor
income taxes generates a motive for distorting the cash-credit good
wedge. Let’s consider the case η
1 > η
2, when by (15), χ > 0. The
government favors redistribution to type 1 agents and can induce
such a redistribution, even with a linear labor tax rate, by
subsidizing cash good consumption for type 1 agents and taxing
it for type 2 agents. Similarly, if η
2 > η
1 and χ < 0, the government
can redistribute to type 2 agents by subsidizing their cash good
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12consumption and taxing it for type 1 agents. However, the
government cannot set agent specific subsidies to cash good
consumption and, in fact, cannot subsidize cash good
consumption at all. By (10), the cash-credit wedge must be
equalized across agents and must be greater than 1. This
restriction is clearly violated in (16).
Even if condition (16) does not hold when constraint (10) is
formally incorporated into the analysis, it clearly identifies when
it will be optimal to depart from the Friedman rule. If η
2 > η
1,
that is when the government favors type 2 agents, a departure
from the Friedman rule relaxes the constraint on redistribution
implicit in the proportional labor income tax. Instead, when the
government favors redistribution towards type 1 agents, a subsidy
to cash goods could play this role. Since such a subsidy violates
the zero lower bound on the net nominal interest rate, the
Friedman rule will be optimal for η
1 > η
2.
2.2 Non-Linear Income Taxes and Private Information
This example makes two changes relative to the previous set
up. First, individual productivities are assumed to be private
information. Second, the government selects a labor income tax
schedule  T (l) that is allowed to be arbitrarily non-linear. As in
Mirrlees (1971), private information implies that the optimal
allocation must satisfy incentive compatibility constraints to
induce agents to truthfully reveal their type. This requirement
shapes the properties of the optimal tax schedule and may
influence the optimal value of the nominal interest rate.
I will revert to the general specification of preferences,
assuming that U (c1,  c2,  l/ξ) is increasing in the first two
arguments, decreasing in the third and strictly concave. In
addition, the single crossing condition will be imposed so that
the indifference curves between credit good consumption and
labor effort l/ξ become flatter as productivity increases
1. Under
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1 See SALANIÉ B. (2000), for a discussion.the single crossing condition, the incentive compatibility
constraint is binding only for the high productivity type and is
given by:
(17)
The zero lower bound constraint for the general utility
specification corresponds to:
(18)
The taxation principle holds in this environment (see Guesnerie,
1998), so the government problem can be formulated in the






maximize (8) subject to (17), (18) and (6).
Let’s first consider the government problem when (18) is
dropped. Denoting with µ and  λ ˜ the multipliers on (17) and on
the resource constraint, respectively, the first order necessary
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Condition  (23) reproduces the customary “no distortions at
the top”. Since type 1 agents do not have an incentive to mimic
type 2 agents, there is no need to distort the allocation for type
2. Instead, type 1's will be distorted as long as type 2's incentive
compatibility constraint is binding, as implied by (24). This
distortion affects the optimal allocation for type 1 in a way that
makes it undesirable for type 2 to misreport her type. In particular,
the distortion corresponds to a positive marginal tax on type 1's
labor income when:
(25)




j for j = 1, 2 and l
2 > l
1 when
the incentive compatibility constraint is binding, (25) holds if the
reduction in labor effort increases the demand for credit good
consumption, that is when credit good consumption and labor
effort are gross substitutes. By contrast, if credit goods and labor
effort are gross complements, and increase in credit good
consumption will increase labor effort, and the optimal marginal
labor income tax on type 2 agents will be negative.
Let’s now consider the implications for the cash-credit wedge.
By (21) and (19):
(26)
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By (26), type 2 agents’ marginal rate of substitution between
cash and credit goods is not distorted, while there will be a
distortion for type 1 agents if the incentive compatibility
constraint is binding and the expression in square brackets in (27)
is not zero. Thus, the rationale for distorting the cash credit
margin for type 2 agents is similar than for the labor wedge. The
consumption pattern is distorted to make it less appealing for type
2 agents to report to be type 1.
The sign and the extent of the cash-credit distortion for type
1 agents depends on preferences. Clearly, for U (⋅) weakly separable
in consumption and labor the cash-credit wedge is undistorted.
More in general, there will be an interaction between the choice
of labor and consumption and it will be optimal to distort the
cash-credit wedge. Specifically, the distortion will be positive when
the marginal rate of substitution between cash and credit good
consumption:
(28)




j for j = 1, 2 and l
2 > l
1 when
the incentive compatibility constraint is binding, (28) corresponds
to a utility specification in which a type 2 agent who cheats and
reduces her labor effort wishes to increase her cash good
consumption more than her credit good consumption. In other
words, it will be optimal to increase the relative price of cash
goods when cash good consumption and labor effort are gross
substitutes. Thus, the marginal tax on cash consumption will
reduce the marginal utility benefit from reducing labor effort and
relax the incentive compatibility constraint. If the opposite
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16inequality holds, cash goods and and a reduction in labor effort
are complements, thus an increase in cash good consumption will
generate a decline in the marginal utility value of a reduction in
labor effort. In this case, it is optimal to subsidize cash good
consumption.
Equation (27) violates (18) in both cases but it points to the
conditions under which a departure from the Friedman rule are
optimal. If a decline in cash good consumption relative to credit
good consumption increases the marginal utility value from
reducing labor effort, R > 1 relaxes the incentive compatibility
constraint and improves efficiency. Instead, if a rise in cash good
consumption relative to credit good consumption induces a
decline in the marginal utility value of reducing labor effort, a
lower nominal interest rate relaxes the incentive compatibility
constraint. In the general government problem, the zero lower
bound constraint on the nominal interest rate will be binding in
this case and the Friedman rule will be optimal. This is exactly
the case considered by da Costa and Werning (2007), who show
that when cash goods and labor effort are gross complements, the
Friedman rule is optimal.
3. - Discussion
3.1 Theory
There is a strong link between the optimality of the Friedman
rule and the uniform commodity taxation principle in representa-
tive agent economies. Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1996) show
that when preferences are homothetic in cash and credit goods and
weakly separable in labor, the Friedman rule holds. Weak separa-
bility is the sufficient condition for optimality of uniform com-
modity in a representative agent economy (see Atkinson and Stiglitz,
1980). Homotheticity also implies that the income elasticity of mon-
ey demand is unitary. If the homotheticity assumption is relaxed,
the inverse elasticity rule of commodity taxation applies. Cash goods
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17should be subsidized relative to credit goods whenever the income
elasticity of money demand is greater than one, that is when an in-
crease in labor supply increases the demand for cash goods. This
case corresponds to gross complementarity in preferences between
cash goods and labor effort. In a real interpretation of the econo-
my, the optimal tax system would subsidize cash goods relative to
credit goods. However, such a subsidy would violate the zero low-
er bound constraint on nominal interest rates in the monetary ver-
sion of the economy. Thus, the binding zero lower bound on the
nominal interest rate implies that the optimality of the Friedman
rule holds for a broader class of preferences than uniform com-
modity taxation.
The uniform commodity taxation principle and the binding
zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate also play a role in
the heterogeneous agent economy discussed above. Atkinson and
Stiglitz (1976) derive the conditions for optimality of uniform
commodity taxation in heterogeneous agent economies. A key in-
sight is that when redistribution is constrained in some way, dif-
ferential commodity taxation may be optimal to attain the desired
distribution of resources. The structure of labor income taxes and
the assumptions on preferences are both critical for the proper-
ties of optimal commodity taxes. The case with differences in pro-
ductivities and linear income tax is one in which differential com-
modity taxation is optimal in general with redistributional objec-
tives. In particular, commodities with high income elasticity
should be taxed more heavily, as they will be consumed more by
high productivity agents. If instead the labor income tax is non-
linear with private information on individual productivities, dif-
ferential commodity taxation is optimal only if the pattern of con-
sumption can serve as a screening device. If utility is homothetic
in consumption and weakly separable in labor, then the income
elasticity of demand is unitary for all commodities, and uniform
commodity taxation applies.
This logic applies squarely to the examples considered here.
In the first, the constraint on redistribution stemming from the
proportional labor income tax motivate departures from the
Friedman rule. This constraint implies that, in a real version of
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equal Pareto weights on both types of agents. Since in the
monetary version, the zero lower bound constraint rules out
subsidies to cash goods, the Friedman rule holds for a range of
Pareto weights. The incentive compatibility constraint places a
limit on redistribution with non-linear labor income taxes.
Departures from the Friedman rule may be warranted if they relax
such constraint. If cash goods and labor effort are gross
substitutes, increasing the relative price of cash goods relaxes the
incentive compatibility constraint, while the opposite is true if
cash goods and labor effort are gross complements. In a monetary
version of the economy, the zero lower bound constraint on
nominal interest rate prevents the relative price of cash goods
from falling below one. Thus, the Friedman rule is optimal for
the class of preferences for which a cash good subsidy would be
optimal in a real version of the economy. This explains the result
in da Costa and Werning (2007) who show that under weak gross
complementarity between cash goods and labor effort the
Friedman rule is optimal.
3.2 Empirical Evidence
The previous discussion suggests that the income elasticity of
monetary holdings is key for the optimality of the Friedman rule
when redistributional considerations are present. The empirical
evidence on the cross-sectional distribution of currency can be
used to discipline assumptions on preferences and transactions
technologies to derive realistic implications for the income
elasticity of money demand and therefore optimal policies.
The empirical evidence strongly suggests a negative correlat-
ion between labor income (and wealth) and cash holdings. Erosa
and Ventura (2000) report that low income households use cash
for a greater fraction of their total purchases relative to high in-
come households in the US. Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (2000) es-
timate the probability of adopting financial technologies that
hedge against inflation, based on US data, and find that is posi-
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education. Attanasio, Guiso and  Jappelli (2001) find that the prob-
ability of using an interest bearing bank account increases with
educational attainment, income and average consumption, based
on cross-sectional household data for Italy. Guiso, Haliassos and
Jappelli. (2001) present evidence from a broad set of countries
that confirms this pattern.
The fact that low income households hold more cash implies
that they are more exposed to inflation. This is consistent with
indirect evidence on the distributional consequences of inflation
presented by Easterly and Fisher (2000). Based on polling data
for 38 countries, they find that the poor are more likely than the
rich to mention inflation as a top national concern. This suggests
that low income household perceive inflation as being more
costly.
This evidence strongly supports models that generate a
negative cross-sectional correlation between labor income and
monetary holdings, giving rise to less than unitary income
elasticity of money demand. In the next section, I present such a
model and derive the implications for optimal fiscal and monetary
policy.
4. - A Monetary Economy with Heterogenous Agents
The economy is populated by agents, firms and a
government. Agents consume, supply labor and trade in assets
in each period. They differ in labor productivity but have
identical preferences. Purchases are made with currency or with
a costly alternative payment technology. Perfectly competitive
firms have access to a linear technology that uses labor to
produce consumption goods. The government finances an
exogenous stream of spending by taxing labor income at a
proportional rate, issuing nominal debt and printing money.
There is no aggregate or idiosyncratic risk.
I now illustrate the model, a version of the one analyzed in
Albanesi (2005), in more detail.
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204.1 Firms
There are two types of competitive firms. All firms live for one
period. Goods firms hire labor to produce a continuum of
differentiated consumption goods indexed on the interval [0, 1]. The
production technology is linear, and different consumption goods
are perfect substitutes in production. Perfect competition implies:
(29) Pt (j) = Wt
for j ∈ [0, 1], where Pt (j) is the price of good j and Wt the nominal
wage per efficiency unit of labor at time t. Pt = Wt will denote the
price of consumption goods.
Financial firms produce transaction services, enabling agents
to purchase goods without the use of cash. A financial firm’s
profits for providing transaction services for the purchase of good
j are:
(30) πt (j) – Wtθ (j)
where θ (⋅) is measured in efficiency units of labor and satisfies
θ' > 0 on the interval [z –, 1], with z – ≥ 0. πt is the dollar charge for
arranging purchases of consumption good j without currency.
Profit maximization implies: πtt (j) = Wtθ (j) for all t and all j ∈
[0, 1]. This specification follows Prescott (1987).
4.2 Agents
A unit measure of agents is divided into two types, where 0
< vi < 1 is the fraction of type i agents, with i = 1, 2 and Σi vi =
1. All agents have identical preferences defined over a
consumption aggregator c
i and over hours of work lt
i given by:
(31)
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21where ρ∈(0, 1) for a agent of type i = 1, 2. I will restrict attention
to preferences of the class:
U (c
i, l
i) = h (c
i) + v (l
i),
where  h is strictly increasing and strictly concave, while v is
strictly decreasing and concave.
Agents of different types differ in labor productivity, denoted
with ξi, for i = 1, 2. I will assume ξ2 > ξ1.
In each period, agents choose transaction services and
consumption levels, they supply labor, accumulate currency and
trade nominal bonds. Given (31) and the assumption on
transaction costs, agents will optimally choose z
i
t, the fraction of





2,t, is the level of consumption of goods purchased with and
without currency, respectively. Then:
Given  M
i
t, an agent beginning of period cash holdings, the
cash in advance constraint is:
(32) Ptc
i





The asset market meets after trading on goods and labor
market has closed. During the asset market session agents receive
labor income net of taxes, clear consumption liabilities and trade
bonds issued by other agents or by the government. Bonds
purchased at time t pay one unit of currency in the t + 1 asset
market. The government and private agents are committed to debt
repayments, so that agents are indifferent between holding
privately or government issued bonds. The price of a nominal
bond at time t is Qt. Net new purchases of bonds by agent i at
time t are denoted with B
i
t+1 for i = 1, 2.
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(33)
where τt is the tax rate on labor income and
the currency cost of arranging purchases of consumption goods
with credit. In addition, a no-Ponzi game condition:
(34)
is also required, with Φt = Π
t-1
t'=0, Qt', Φ0 = 1.
4.3 Government
The government finances an exogenous stream of consump-
tion g – and is subject to the budget constraint:
(35) Pt g –
t + Mt + Bt = QtBt+1 + Mt+1 + WtTt
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t for t = –1,0, 1... and choose z
i
t.
2. Agents, firms and the government trade on the goods and
labor markets. The agents’ purchases of cash goods are subject to
(32). Clearing on the goods market requires:
(37)
3. Asset markets open. Agents purchase bonds and acquire
currency to take into the following period subject to the constraint
(33). Clearing on the asset market requires:
(38)
DEFINITION 1. A competitive equilibrium is given by a government











t}i=1, 2, t≥0 such that:
1. given the policy and the price system agents and firms
optimize;
2. government policy satisfies (35) and (36);
3. markets clear.
The following proposition characterizes the competitive
equilibrium.










t}i=1, 2, t≥0 and a price
system {Pt, Wt, Qt, πt (j)}t≥0,j∈[0,1] constitute a competitive equilibrium
if and only if, for a given government policy {gt, τt, Mt+1, Bt}t≥0, (37),
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25Equation (44) is the agents’ intertemporal budget constraint and
it incorporates the transversality condition. The proof of this
proposition is in Appendix A.
5. - Ramsey Equilibrium
The Ramsey equilibrium is the competitive equilibrium that
maximizes social welfare from the standpoint of time 0. The
government selects policies once and for all at time 0 for all future
periods and is committed to following these plans. The social
welfare function is simply a weighted sum of the agents’ lifetime
utility. The Pareto weight on type i agents is ηi, with η1 + η2 = 1.
Pareto weights are time-invariant and the case ηi = vi corresponds
to a utilitarian government.
As the one period example, I solve for the Ramsey equilibrium
by deriving the Ramsey allocation problem, where the government
chooses an allocation at time 0 subject to the constraint that it










PROPOSITION 3. An allocation {ci1,t, ci2,t, lit, z it}i=1, 2, t≥0 and values




(46) Rt ≥ 1
(47)
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agents economy in Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1996). Constraints
(45)-(47) are the analogue of (10) and (11) in the first example in
Section 2. The level of P0 should also be a choice variable, since
it is not pinned down by the competitive equilibrium conditions
and competitive equilibria are indexed by P0. However, the
qualitative properties of Ramsey policies for t > 0 do not depend
on the value of P0, so I take it as given and treat it as an initial
condition for the purpose of this analysis. 
5.1 Optimal Policies
The key properties of Ramsey policy for t > 0 are described
in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 4. Assume:
(A1) U (c, l) = h (c) + v (l), with h (⋅) strictly increasing and
strictly concave and v (⋅) strictly decreasing and concave;
(A2) θ (j) is strictly increasing for j ∈ [z –, 1], with z – ≥ 0, and
limz↓z – θ (z) = 0.
Then, Rt = 1 for t ≥ 1 in the Ramsey equilibrium, if and only
if constraint (47) is not binding. Moreover, if (47) is non-binding,
η1 ≥η –
1 with 0 < η –
1.
The proof of this proposition is an application of Albanesi
(2005) and is omitted for brevity. It is similar to the proof of the
optimality of the Friedman rule for a representative agent
economy in Christiano, Chari and Kehoe (1996) and relies on the
homotheticity of the consumption aggregator and separability of
utility in consumption and leisure imposed in (A1). It holds
irrespective of the functional form of v (⋅) or initial conditions
2.
Proposition 4 demonstrates that the Friedman rule is not
optimal when high productivity agents enjoy a relatively high
Pareto weight, that is η1, is low. The intuition is similar to that
Redistribution and Optimal Monetary Policy, etc. S. ALBANESI
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2 The proof of this proposition implicitely also shows that in a homogeneous
agent version of this economy the Friedman rule would be optimal. In such an
economy, the constraints (45) and (47) would not be part of the Ramsey problem.for the first example in Section 2. The optimal labor wedge for
each type of agent i is decreasing in ηi and in the value of the
multiplier on the implementability constraint, a measure of the
cost of raising distortionary revenues. Linear labor taxation forces
this wedge to be equalized across agents in any equilibrium, which
results in constraint (47). As in the one period economy, this
constraint will be generically be binding. A departure from the
Friedman rule can relax this constraint with heterogeneity in
transaction patterns.
The redistributional effects of monetary policy and the
optimal nominal interest rate hinge critically on the negative
cross-sectional correlation between cash holdings and labor
productivities, an implication of the equilibrium income elasticity
of money demand in this model. One can define a short run
elasticity, corresponding to the sensitivity of money holdings to
consumption for given transaction pattern, that is z
i
t. This
depends on the properties of the utility function only and is equal
to one in this model, given the homotheticity in consumption of
U (⋅) for given z. The long run elasticity incorporates the effect
on  z
i. Since by (42) the average cost of transaction services is
decreasing in the level of consumption, the long run income
elasticity of money demand is smaller than one. This property
implies that high productivity agents hold less cash as a fraction
of consumption. Consequently, a departure from the Friedman
rule is optimal when the government wishes to redistribute in
their favor, that is when the Pareto weight on low productivity
agents is low enough.
What would be the predictions of this model with non-linear
taxes and private information on labor productivities? da Costa
and Werning (2007) consider a general utility specification of the
form  U (m, c, l) and show that the Friedman rule is optimal if
money and labor are gross complements. For the model in this
paper, solving the sub-optimization problem in which for given
real balances, credit good consumption and labor effort, agents
choose z and cash good consumption delivers an indirect utility
function of the form U (m, c, l), with U separable in {m, c} and
l. This separability implies that the level of monetary holdings does
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28not influence labor effort and thus the Friedman rule would be
optimal with non-linear income taxes. More in general, if utility
is allowed to be non-separable in consumption and labor, it is
straightforward to show that m and  I are gross substitutes for
given c in the implied specification of U, if z is increasing in c.
Gross substitutability between money holdings and labor follows
from the fixed cost of using alternatives to cash to make payments.
In turn, this feature is essential for generating an empirically
plausible cross-sectional distribution of currency. Gross substitut-
ability between money holdings and labor effort implies that a rise
in the nominal interest rate relaxes the incentive compatibility
constraint in da Costa and Werning’s model, as illustrated in the
simple example discussed in Section 2. da Costa and Werning
assume a utilitarian government and do not consider redistribut-
ional motives. This discussion suggests that with assumptions on
preferences that generate an empirically plausible cross-sectional
distribution of money, even with non-linear labor income taxes,
the Friedman rule is optimal only if the government wishes to
redistribute in favor of the low productivity agents. Otherwise,
efficiency considerations would render positive nominal interest
rates optimal.
Battacharya, Haslag and Martin (2005) also analyze de-
partures from the Friedman rule in a variety of heterogeneous
agent models with ad hoc restrictions on fiscal instruments and
show that the optimal monetary policy is sensitive to those
restrictions.
5.2 A Calibrated Example
It is interesting to analyze the properties of optimal policies
as a function of the distribution of Pareto weights for a calibrated
example to quantitatively evaluate the extent to which departures
from the Friedman rule are optimal.
I consider the following specification for utility and transact-
ions technology:




where 0 ≤ z – < z – ≤ 1.
I set β = 0.97 and σ = 0.8. Other parameters are chosen so
that in a steady state with τ1 = τ2 = 0.30 and R = 1.05 the model
matches corresponding averages for the US economy. The fraction
of low productivity agents in the population is set to 0.6 and their
productivity is set to ξ1 = 1, while ξ2 is set so that the Gini
coefficient for consumption in the model is equal to 25.5%
3. The
properties of money demand depend on ρ, θ0 and θ1. I fix ρ = 0.5
and set θ0 and  θ1 to approximate the interest elasticity and the
average velocity of transactions accounts (currency plus checkable
deposits, plus time and savings deposits) as a fraction of personal
consumption expenditures. These two statistics are equal to
–5.11% and 1.37, respectively, based on Flow of Funds data for
the post-war period. Initial real and nominal debt holdings are set
to 0 and the distribution of currency is symmetric. The parameters
are summarized in Table 1.
Graph 1 displays the results for the case with linear labor
taxation. The optimal nominal interest rate and labor tax rate are
plotted as a function of η1, for t > 0. The Friedman rule is optimal
for η1 ≥ v1 = 0.6. The tax rate on labor is increasing in η1, even
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3 More details on the calibration are available in ALBANESI S. (2005).implementability constraint on type 2 falls (and the one for type
1 increases) as η1 rises. In other words, the marginal value of
transferring resources to type 2 falls, which induces a rise in the
optimal labor tax rate. The tax rate on labor varies from 0.17 to
0.41, while the net nominal interest rate from 16% to 0. The value
of η1 need not be extremely small to motivate empirical plausible
departures from the Friedman rule. For example, for η1 = 0.5, the
net nominal interest rate is equal to 7%.





β z – z – v1 ξ1 ρ
0.97 0.10 0.75 0.6 1 0.5
Calibrated
σγ 0 γ1 ξ2 θ0 θ1
0.8 1.6 1 2.5 0.053 0.2
GRAPH 1
PROPORTIONAL LABOR TAX


























R6. - Time Inconsistency
What are the implications for time consistency of Ramsey
policies? It is well known that Ramsey policies are time
inconsistent in a representative agent framework (Kydland and
Prescott, 1977)
4. With distortionary taxes, a “surprise” revision of
the intertemporal path of taxes that depreciates the present value
of outstanding government liabilities can effectively reproduce the
missing lump sum tax.
Lucas and Stokey (1983) show that in a real economy this
incentive can be eliminated by appropriately restructuring
outstanding claims on the government. This option is not available
in a monetary economy. To ensure time consistency, both real and
nominal government debt must be non-zero for a given path of
prices. But any positive level of nominal debt generates the
temptation to inflite it away with a one time rise in the price level.
Lucas and Stokey conclude that commitment to a path for
nominal prices is necessary for time consistency in a monetary
economy. Alvarez, Kehoe and Neumeyer (2004) also examine this
issue and prove that optimality of the Friedman rule is a necessary
and sufficient condition for time consistency. The key step in their
argument is that, under the Friedman rule, a monetary economy
is equivalent to a real economy. Then, setting the present value of
nominal government liabilities to zero at all dates and states
removes the incentive to change the path of prices, while an
appropriate choice of the maturity structure of real debt can
remove the incentive to change the path of taxes.
With heterogeneous agents, since agent specific lump sum
taxes are typically not available, there could be two motives for
deviating from previously announced policies: increasing efficiency
and improving redistribution. This would seem to exacerbate the
time inconsistency problem.
Albanesi (2005) analyzes time consistency of Ramsey policies
in a version of the model presented in Section 4 and shows that
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4 In economies with capital, there is an additional incentive to deviate from
previously announced plans, since the capital tax does not distort past investment
decisions.Ramsey policies are time consistent. The proof follows the simple
strategy laid out by Lucas and Stokey (1983), based on the
following operational definition of time consistency. For any t ≥
0, define the Ramsey problem at period t analogously to the
Ramsey problem for period 0. Then, the Ramsey problem at
period t is time consistent for period t + 1, if the solution of the
Ramsey problem at period t solves the Ramsey problem at t +
1. The Ramsey equilibrium is time consistent if the Ramsey
problem at time t is time consistent for the Ramsey problem at
t + 1 for t ≥ 0. In practice, since the Ramsey equilibrium
allocation is a stationary function of the state for t ≥ 1, it is
sufficient to identify a set of initial conditions for the time 1
problem exist that would induce the government at time 1 to
continue with the allocation that solves the Ramsey problem at
time 0.
The time consistency of Ramsey policies with heterogeneous
agents is that a one time change in the price level has
redistributional effects. The redistributional costs can offset any
efficiency gains for an appropriate distribution of nominal debt
5.
Since agents are indifferent with respect to their portfolio
composition in equilibrium, it is always possible to identify a
distribution of debt that guarantees the government will stick to
Ramsey policies in future periods.
What happens with non-linear taxes? In this case, there are no
incentives to deviate for the purpose of reducing the deadweight
burden associated with government consumption, since lump sum
taxes are allowed. However, there will be an incentive to revise
policies to ameliorate the distribution of resources. With a
utilitarian social welfare function, it would be optimal to equalize
consumption across agents with different productivities. However,
thus policy violates incentive compatibility constraints. More
consumption must be promised to high ability agents to induce
them to reveal their type, rather than mimic low ability agents.
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5 This argument was first explored by ROGERS C.A. (1986), who studies optimal
wage and capital taxes in a two-period, multiple consumer economy. She finds
that the incentive to raise capital taxes may be moderated by redistributional
concerns.Once abilities have been revealed, however, the government has the
incentive to equalize consumption, giving rise to time inconsis-
tency. This problem was first laid out by Roberts (1984). How is
the argument affected with heterogeneous monetary holdings? In
the case considered by da Costa and Werning (2007), the
complementarity of money holdings and labor effort implies a
positive correlation between monetary holdings and ability. Then,
a surprise increase in the price level equalizes the distribution of
consumption. By contrast, when monetary holdings and labor
effort are substitutes in preferences, high ability agents hold less
money, as in the data. The negative correlation between monetary
holdings and ability may give rise to the incentive to engineer a
one time decline in the price level. Thus, fiscal policy is time
inconsistent and so is monetary policy.
7. - Shocks
The previous analysis completely abstracts from the presence
of aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks. Still, the results suggest a
few informed conjectured. Let’s consider the case with aggregate
shocks first. With non-linear taxes aggregate shocks can be
smoothed by changing the level of the lump-sum component of
taxes, so they do not affect the analysis. With linear taxes, a
fundamental result in representative agent economies is that
inflation exhibits very high volatility (Chari, Christiano and Kehoe,
1991). Innovations in inflation are used to impart the optimal
amount of state contingency to the real value of nominal bond
returns, thus allowing to maintain labor income taxes. This is
optimal since innovations in inflation act as a lump sum tax and
distortions associated with the labor taxation are convex in the
tax rate.
The forces shaping the stochastic properties of optimal inflation
with linear taxes are very similar to those that lead to time
inconsistency. This suggests that in a heterogeneous agent version
of the model optimal inflation volatility may be substantially
reduced. Innovations in inflation redistribute resources across
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inflation volatility that would be required to optimally smooth
distortionary taxes in the face of aggregate shocks necessarily
involves systematic redistribution in alternative directions. For
example, if money is the only asset, since low ability households
hold more cash as a fraction of total purchases, positive innovations
in inflation redistribute against them and negative innovations
redistribute in their favor. Depending on the strength of
redistributional consideration, the government may find it optimal
to limit inflation volatility to prevent the negative redistributional
effects of inflation innovations.
The effect of idiosyncratic shocks is more subtle. Levine
(1991) is perhaps the first to point out that the Friedman rule
may be suboptimal with idiosyncratic shocks. His argument is
based on the fact that implementing the Friedman rule requires
a stationary rate of monetary contraction. This is suboptimal
when financed with lump sum taxes since it weighs more heavily
on agents that, due to adverse idiosyncratic shocks, have low
income. On the other hand, Erosa and Ventura (2002) show that
an increase in the average inflation rate can generate adverse
distributional consequences in a version of the model in Section
4. In their economy, agents’-hold money, nominal bonds and
physical capital. Fixed costs of asset participation imply that
low income agents hold a greater share of money in their
portfolio, which in turn implies that they can reap lower rate
of returns with positive inflation. Since idiosyncratic shocks
generate a precautionary motive for asset accumulation, the rate
of return differential associated with positive inflation implies
that low ability households have smaller opportunities for self-
insurance, leading to a large increase in inequality in wealth
and welfare for revenue neutral increases in average inflation.
These results suggest that optimal monetary policy with
idiosyncratic shocks depends crucially on the set of available
fiscal instruments.
Let’s consider a version of the model in Section 4 where agents
are ex ante identical and are subject to idiosyncratic productivity
shocks, and assume the government is utilitarian. High labor
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agents that have enjoyed a long series of good productivity shocks
will hold little money, high levels of nominal government bonds
and have high consumption relative to agents that experienced a
long series of adverse shocks. Innovations in inflation will ame-
liorate the distribution of resources if the differences in govern-
ment debt holdings are sufficiently greater than those in cash
holdings. On the other hand, low nominal interest rates on the
margin will redistribute to unlucky agents. If the government can
also provide (uniform) lump sum transfers, it may be optimal to
increase marginal taxes to finance positive lump sum transfers,
given that there will be a positive social value to transferring
resources to those agents that receive adverse shocks in the
current period.
In dynamic models with private information and idiosyncratic
productivity shocks, monetary holdings can play multiple roles. As
in da Costa and Werning (2007), they can be seen as just another
commodity with a relative price that corresponds to the nominal
interest rate. Alternatively, money can play the role of an asset.
Let’s consider these possibilities in order.
If money is just another commodity, optimal monetary policy
is tied once again to the optimality of uniform commodity
taxation. Golosov, Kocherlakota and Tsyvinski (2003) show that
with weakly separable preferences in consumption and labor,
uniform commodity taxation is optimal in this class of models,
consistent with the findings in Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976). If
preferences are allowed to be non-separable, it may be desirable
to depart from the Friedman rule if this relaxes incentive
compatibility constraints, as previously discussed.
If money is an asset, that is it is held mainly as a store of
value rather than for transaction purposes, the picture is quite
different. Agents who experience a long history of good shocks
will end up accumulating high levels of money. Thus, money
holdings can serve as a statistic for an agent history. Moreover,
agents can use money to self-insure. This is desirable from an
individual standpoint, since the optimal allocation in this class of
models exhibits incomplete insurance due to the incentive
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36problem. However, it is suboptimal from a social standpoint, since
the additional insurance provided by monetary holdings
undermines the provision of incentives.
The results in Kocherlakota (2005) and Albanesi and Sleet
(2006) can be extrapolated to derive implications for optimal
monetary policy in this context. Both papers show that it is
optimal to tax assets with idiosyncratic ability shocks and that
the marginal tax on assets should be higher for low income
agents. This makes the after tax return on assets between t and
t + 1 negatively correlated with labor income in t + 1, thus
discouraging agents from accumulating assets for self-insurance
purposes. This form of asset taxation relaxes the incentive
compatibility constraint at time t + 1 and requires that marginal
taxes on monetary holdings should be agent specific. Since
optimal allocations are history dependent in this class of
economies, the properties of asset taxes will also depend on the
degree to which individual asset holdings convey information
on past histories of shocks. Kocherlakota (2005) allows labor
and asset taxes to depend on the entire history of labor supply
and shows that in this case the average or expected marginal
tax on assets is zero. If the asset is money, this would
correspond to a zero inflation rate. Albanesi and Sleet (2006)
allow taxes to be conditioned only on current labor income and
outstanding asset holdings. Thus, asset holdings serve as a
statistic for the past history of shocks. They show that in this
case the optimal marginal average or expected tax on assets
should be positive. This would correspond to positive inflation
if the asset is money.
Green and Zhou (2005) also consider economies with privately
observed idiosyncratic taste or ability shocks and evaluate the
efficiency of monetary mechanisms, that is implementations in
which money holdings serve as a summary of an agent history.
They interpret linear updating rules on the history as inflationary
or contractionary mechanisms. Their treatment is considerably
more abstract and concentrates on the history encoding role of
monetary holdings.
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The main purpose of this article is to emphasize the rich set
of policy questions raised by the introduction of heterogeneity in
monetary economies. Recent work suggests that the implications
for optimal policies might be starkly different than for
representative agent economies. Albanesi (2005) examines the case
with linear income taxation and shows that heterogeneity breaks
the link between high inflation and lack of commitment. First, the
Friedman rule need not hold under commitment. With a negative
cross-sectional correlation between money holdings and labor
income, as in the data, optimality of the Friedman rule requires
a high Pareto weight on low income agents. Moreover, optimal
fiscal and monetary policies are time consistent. The redistribut-
ional costs of ex post deviations from Ramsey, policies offset the
corresponding efficiency gains —. da Costa and Werning (2007)
analyze a model with non-linear income taxes and private
information on individual abilities. They show that the Friedman
rule is optimal if cash holdings and labor effort are gross
complements. However, this assumption would lead to a cross-
sectional distribution of money holdings that is inconsistent with
empirical evidence. In their framework, optimal policies would
typically be time inconsistent.
Both papers abstract from aggregate or idiosyncratic shocks
and stop short of analyzing sequentially optimal policies. The
previous discussion should provide a compelling argument that
extending the analysis in this direction is both interesting and
important.
One question that remains completely unexplored is optimal
stabilization policy in the presence of heterogeneity. It is well
known that low skill workers are disproportionally hit by job loss
in recessions and that these episodes of unemployment may
generate persistent declines in lifetime earnings. To the extent that
monetary policy can reduce business cycle volatility and in
particular the intensity of recessionary episodes, it may have a
significant impact on welfare and play an important role in
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of monetary policy  with endogenous earnings inequality is a very
promising topic for future research.
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39APPENDIX
A: Characterization of Private Sector Equilibria










t}i=1, 2, t≥0 with l
i
t > 0
for i = 1, 2 and t ≥ 0, and a price system {Pt, Wt, Qt, πt (j)} t≥0,j∈[0,1]




Mt+1, Bt+1}t≥0. Then, conditions (29) and (30) derive from optimality
of firm behavior, conditions (37) and  (38) from clearing in the
goods and assets markets. The other conditions follow from
household optimization.
The Lagrangian for the household problem is given by:
where  c
i




t are the multipliers on the
cash in advance constraint and the wealth evolution equation,
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as well as (32) and (33). To see that (58) is a necessary condition
for household optimization, suppose it does not hold and
(The strictly smaller case is rule out by (34)). Then, it is
possible to construct a consumption sequence such that the budget
constraint is satisfied in each period and utility for each type of
household is greater, violating optimality. Combining (51)-(53)
yields (41), while (53) and (54) determine (40). The expression in
(39) follows from (54), (57) and (29), while (43) follows from (51)-
(53) at t = 0. To derive (44), multiply (33) by φt
i and apply (51)
and (56). Use (51), (53)-(55), multiply by β
t and sum over t from
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t. Substitute into (59), to obtain (44).













and a price system {Pt, Wt, Qt, qt, (j)}t≥0,j∈[0,1] satisfy (29)-(44) and
(37) for a given policy {g
–
t,  τt,  Mt+1,  Bt}t≥0 for which (35) holds.
Then, goods and financial firms optimize. To see that household
optimization conditions are satisfied consider an alternative
candidate plan {c' i1t,  c' i2t,  l' it,  z' it,}i=1,2,t≥0 which satisfies the
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41intertemporal budget constraint for the price system {Pt, Wt, Qt,
qt, (j)}. This implies that:
using  (39) and the fact that {c
i






t}i=1, 2, t≥0 satisfies (41)-
(44) and that the intertemporal budget constraint holds as a weak
inequality using (34) and (33) for the price system {Pt, Wt, Qt, qt,
(j)}t≥0,j∈[0,1]. By concavity of u
i:
where c' it is defined by (31). This establishes the result since (38)
and (37) guarantee market clearing.
B: Solving the Ramsey Problem
To solve the Ramsey allocation problem, it is useful to define
the function Z (R, c) = max {z –, min {z*, 1}} where z* solves:
By assumption A3, Zc > 0 and ZR > 0 for c > 0 and R ≥ 1.
The constraint z
i
t = Z (Rt, c
i
2, t) needs to be imposed on the Ramsey
allocation problem to ensure that the government chooses the
same value of z
i
t that would be chosen by the agents in a private
sector equilibrium. This constraint is substituted in the Ramsey
allocation problem.
The Lagrangian for the Ramsey problem is:
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t Rt, P0, and minimize Λ with respect to µ
i
t, λi, ζt,
µt, ωt, for i = 1, 2 and t ≥ 0, subject to z
i
t =  Z (Rt,  c
i
2, t). I will
characterize the solution to the Ramsey allocation problem by
deriving the first order necessary conditions for this problem.
Since the second order necessary conditions for this problem
involve third derivative of U, the task of verifying that they hold
is intractable but for very specific assumptions on U. As Lucas
and Stokey (1983), I simply assume that a solution of the system
of equations resulting from the first order necessary conditions
exists and constitutes an optimum for the Ramsey allocation
problem.
It is convenient to introduce the following notation:
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